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1975 CrisisImpounding of the Keban and the 
Tabqa Dams
1990 Crisis Impounding of the Atatürk Dam
1996 Crisis Construction of the Birecik Dam
JOINT TECHNICAL COMMITTEE (JTC)
1983-1992 JTC held 16 meetings
1993 JTC meetings suspended
2007 JTC meetings revitalized
WATER USE RULES IN THE REGION
The Interim Protocol of 1987 Between Turkey and 
Syria
The Protocol of 1990 Between Syria and Iraq
HIGH LEVEL STRATEGIC COOPERATION COUNCILS
NEW PROTOCOLS ON WATER
RIVERS OF COOPERATION
New Water Protocols: MoUs
 Among the 48 Memoranda of 
Understanding which were signed between 
Turkey and Iraq on October 15, 2009, one 
was on “water”:
-calibration of existing hydrological measuring stations; 
-modernisation of existing irrigation systems;
-prevention of water losses from domestic water supply 
construction of water supply and water treatment 
facilities in Iraq wtp of Turkish companies; 
-development of mechanisms to solve problems arising 
during drought period; 
-joint investigation, planning for flood protection. 
 Turkey and Syria signed on December 24, 
2009 at the High Level Strategic 
Cooperation Council in Damascus, 50
MoUs including four related to water:
– The Joint Friendship Dam on the Asi/Orontes
river
– Syrian water withdrawals from the Tigris
– Coping with the drought
– Remediation of the water quality
CHALLENGES
l The biggest obstacle to cooperation and 
coordinated management of transboundary water 
resources in the basin is political instabilities and 
shifting power balances. 
l Overarching political problems, namely the Syrian 
civil war and the deterioration of bilateral political 
relations between any pair of the riparians
constitute disabling political background for the 
implementation of efficient and equitable water 
policy in the basin. 
Emergence of violent non-state actors
 The spread of ISIS across region ended up with “non-state 
actors” to seize control of water resources in Syria and 
Iraq. 
 IS subsequently lost control of all of the dams, but not 
before using them to flood or starve downstream 
populations, to pressure them to surrender. 
 The emergence of IS in the region urges riparian states to 
be robustly prepared and utterly responsive to possible 
attacks to water supply and development infrastructure in 
the region. 
 This phenomenon should instruct the riparian states of the 
need to establish regional security arrangements to 
preserve and protect their resources. 
Climate change
 Water security in the region 
is in jeopardy due to human-
induced climatic changes.
 Policy analysts have 
previously suggested that 
the drought played a role in 
the Syrian unrest, and the 
researchers addressed this as 
well, saying the drought 
“had a catalytic effect.”
PROSPECTS
 On-going cooperation : Turkey-Iraq track 
– It involves technical cooperation on issues related to 
building joint dams; promoting exchange and 
calibration of data pertaining to Tigris river flows; 
irrigation technologies and dam safety (Mosul Dam).
– It demonstrates that even during volatile times when 
multilateral negotiations became impossible, riparians 
could continue talks regarding the transboundary 
waters at a bilateral level.
l How would transboundary water cooperation 
look like in future? 
– Building on and strengthening existing 
transboundary institutions.
– Transboundary water institutions, namely the JTC, 
could act as a multilateral platform in framing and 
implementing water cooperation frameworks.
– Compared to bilateral water sharing treaties, the 
existing MoUs, with their broader outlook, can 
provide useful guidelines for establishing 
comprehensive transboundary water cooperation. 
 These bilateral MoUs should be synthesized 
in a multilateral framework agreement 
which involves all of the riparian states as 
well as all of the concerned stakeholders, 
including civil society organizations and 
private companies from the sectors of 
energy, agriculture, environment, and health 
as well as the interested third parties such as 
international agencies, regional 
organizations and partner countries.
 Transboundary water cooperation should 
resume, whenever there is a chance to do 
so, from a variety of perspectives and issues 
that may provide opportunities for regional 
cooperation anew. 
 In such a context, third parties such as the 
UN agencies, EU, the concerned European 
countries and  development/aid agencies 
can offer array of perspectives which 
include initiatives for dialogue, trust 
building, information exchange, analysis 
and regional investment prioritization.
 Collaborative projects could be conducted 
in water-related development fields such as 
energy, agriculture, the environment, and 
health. International actors could facilitate 
such regional cooperation through technical 
and financial assistance.
 Lessons can be drawn from progressive 
cases such as the Mekong River 
Commission and the Nile Basin Initiative 
whereby international actors played 
constructive roles.
 Multilateral cooperation could provide a number 
of important building blocks that can support 
cooperative efforts in the region: 
 It could contribute to improved water security 
for small and large water users; efficiency and 
productivity of water use, and generation of 
additional socio-economic benefits per unit of 
water; management of ecosystem goods and 
services at the regional scale and restoration 
options of deteriorated ecosystems; participation 
of stakeholders; accountability and 
communication. 
Concluding remarks: contours of third 
party involvement
 International actors should support and act within 
the existing transboundary water cooperation 
modalities in the region. 
 Riparian states are the ultimate decision-makers 
with regards to fundamental principles and 
practices in transboundary water diplomacy.
 International actors should refrain from 
interventions in foreign policy making in 
transboundary waters instead support basin-wide 
cooperation through partnerships among research 
centers, development agencies, universities and 
ministries and private companies.
